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Washington and Lee Law Review - Developments

Development

by Wee Jin Yeo

The territoriality principle, basic to United States trademark law, provides that foreign uses of a trademark do not give the user trademark rights in the United States. An important exception to this principle is the well-known marks doctrine, which allows a foreign user to obtain priority rights in the United States over a mark used exclusively overseas, if it has achieved a measure of renown in the United States. However, until now, it remains uncertain whether the doctrine is part of United States federal trademark law, given the split between the Ninth and the Second Circuits on the issue.

On March 23, 2016, the Fourth Circuit handed down the decision of Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, which protected foreign marks neither registered nor used in the United States.

This Article takes this timely opportunity to revive the debate on the applicability of the well-known marks doctrine in trademark law. Analyzing the Fourth Circuit’s decision, this Article argues that it provides a useful insight on how the circuit split should be resolved, but cautions future courts not to mechanically apply the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

Development

by Colin Miller

On January 13th, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral arguments in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. The question that the Court must decide is whether the federal government and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. This essay argues that the Supreme Court cannot answer this question in the affirmative without overturning precedent holding that the U.S. government can unilaterally impose the Federal Death Penalty Act in Puerto Rico. In other words, the Court cannot deprive Puerto Rican citizens of the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause unless it adopts the concept of popular sovereignty.

Development

by Carl Tobias

In late April 2015, the Supreme Court of Virginia announced that Justice LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. would retire on July 31, 2015. Democratic Governor Terry McAuliffe expeditiously created an open process for tapping a worthy successor. At July’s conclusion, the Governor appointed Fairfax County Circuit Judge Jane Marum Roush, an experienced, consensus jurist. On a Sunday night, merely two days after Roush swore her oath of office, Republican General Assembly leaders proclaimed their caucuses’ intention to elect another individual, despite conceding that Roush was very qualified. During the August special session, this concerted GOP endeavor prompted a Republican senator to join Democrats who opposed the prospect and concomitantly adjourned. GOP leaders then contended that legislators remained in session, as the Virginia Constitution explicitly prescribes Senate and House of Delegates consent to adjourn. The Governor’s Counsel next penned an opinion that concluded that lawmakers had adjourned, so McAuliffe could appoint Justice Roush to the Court again, a choice that he implemented thirty days after adjournment. Because these efforts precipitated a constitutional standoff and will consequently plague future judicial selection, they warrant analysis.

The initial part of this Article chronicles the rise and evolution of Virginia court selection. Part Two scrutinizes recent machinations, determining that the procedures now merit improvement. The last section proffers suggestions. For the near term, the Assembly ought to promptly elect Roush. She brings twenty-two years of judicial service, including over five months as a justice. Moreover, Roush’s removal for reasons unrelated to her abilities, earlier performance, or future capacity to serve would make a mockery of the selection regime, undermining citizen respect for it, the whole state judiciary, as well as the Governor and the Assembly. Across the longer term, the Commonwealth must evaluate and initiate changes that will enhance selection.

Development

by Ryan H. Nelson

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Baldwin v. Foxx opined—for the first time—that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Article tackles the two administrative law questions that Baldwin poses: what level of deference should a court afford Baldwin, and should such deference force that court to overturn precedent holding that sexual orientation discrimination lies beyond the purview of Title VII?

First, after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Barnhart, lower courts have split on whether Chevron Step Zero should be governed by the rule-of-law test announced in Christensen and Mead, or whether Barnhart’s five-factor test provides a new standard for this inquiry. This Article explains why the Christensen/Mead rule-of-law test should govern Chevron Step Zero; why that test dictates that courts should analyze Baldwin under the deference test announced in Skidmore, not Chevron; and why Baldwin consequently deserves de minimis deference.

Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brand X held that judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes must be overturned in the face of subsequent, contrary agency interpretations that would have earned Chevron deference but for stare decisis. Yet, no exception to stare decisis exists when an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute earns mere Skidmore deference. This Article examines such a potential exception, concluding that stare decisis should trump agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, Skidmore deference notwithstanding.

This Article concludes that Baldwin is far from a watershed moment for LGBT workplace equality. Rather, the courts—which have almost uniformly held that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation does not violate Title VII—should uphold such decisions despite Baldwin and the meager Skidmore deference it earns. Indeed, congressional action remains the only way to ban employment discrimination based on sexual orientation on a national scale.

 

Development

by David H. Kaye

For over 130 years, scientific sleuths have inspected hairs under microscopes. Late in 2012, the FBI, the Innocence Project, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers joined forces to review thousands of microscopic hair comparisons performed by FBI examiners over several of those decades. The results have been astounding. Based on the first few hundred cases in which hairs were said to match, it appears that examiners exceeded the limits of science in over 90% of their reports or testimony. The disclosure of this statistic has led to charges that the FBI faked an entire field of forensic science, placed pseudoscience in the witness box, and palmed off virtually worthless and scientifically indefensible evidence as scientific truth.

This essay disputes these interpretations of the 90+% figure. Based on some of the scientific literature on hair comparisons, the public descriptions of the hair review project that have emerged, and some of the confessions of scientific error that the FBI has issued, it reaches three conclusions: (1) associating two hairs by their physical features can be slightly probative of whether they originated from the same source; (2) the hair review project does not bear on the validity of these associations or the quality of the examinations; rather, it is supposed to flag cases in which examiners have overstated the power of a match to identify the source of the trace evidence; (3) some questionable determination have been issued, and the 90+% figure may not be a valid and reliable measure of overclaiming.

To promote a more complete understanding of the nature and extent of overclaiming, the review process should be made more transparent, and the materials it produces should be readily available for researchers and the public to study. New state or local evidence reviews should be designed with these concerns in mind. Finally, in all areas of forensic science, clear standards for presenting identification evidence without overclaiming should be devised, and training and monitoring programs should be implemented to ensure that laboratory personnel and prosecutors adhere to them.

Development

by Victor Williams

In March 2015, the debt ceiling was hit again and sovereign default loomed. Refusing to timely raise the debt ceiling, congressional ideologues have four times pushed our nation to the brink of a catastrophic debt default in as many years. Our struggling economy is again threatened, financial institutions are again spending millions planning for default, and vulnerable citizens are once again worrying about their benefit payments. Enough is enough.

This Essay argues that nationwide bondholder litigation can void the unconstitutional debt ceiling, and it presents the first litigation in that effort. (Williams v. Lew, No. 15-1565, U.S. Court of Appeals – D.C. Circuit). The Constitution guarantees not only that public debt will remain valid, but also that the integrity of those obligations will never be so much as questioned by our nation’s government. The debt limit statute, facially and as-applied, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Bondholders have standing to challenge the unconstitutional statute as they suffer economic and noneconomic injuries resulting from the degradation of their investments’ uniquely low-risk profile and monetary value. These injuries manifest as both current harm and certainly-impending future harm.

In the NAACP and ACLU’s tradition of “test cases,” the author’s litigation is prosecuted with modest-success expectations, but with strong determination to prompt future litigation by others. The Justice Department has already exposed a defense strategy based on combining Tea Party default-denial delusion with Clapper v. Amnesty International standing hurdles.

The Essay pleas for state sovereigns and institutional bondholders (with alternative standing allegations) to initiate additional litigation. Public interest law firms, such as the National Chamber Litigation Center and the Constitutional Accountability Center, are challenged to lend support. As bond buying has been since the Republic’s founding, this litigation effort is a necessary act of economic patriotism.

Development

by Rick Kirgis

In a federal system with state lines that are easily crossed, physically and electronically, legal disputes often raise choice-of- law issues. Common among those disputes are torts and contracts cases. The courts have taken a variety of approaches to these cases, leading to inconsistent results that depend largely on which forum the plaintiff selects. Judicial fairness and economy dictate, or should dictate, that the choice-of-law issues be resolvable consistently and without unnecessarily tying up the courts or imposing large litigation costs, if it can be done in a principled manner. This article shows how it could be done.

Development

by John P. Gross

The State of Utah has a unique way of providing representation in criminal cases to defendants who are too poor to hire an attorney. In Utah, there is no statewide funding or supervision of indigent defense. Each county, city, or town is responsible for creating and funding their own indigent defense delivery system. Utah is one of only two states in the United States—Pennsylvania is the other—that fails to provide state funding or oversight of indigent defense. But what makes Utah truly unique is the way in which counties and municipalities are required to structure their indigent defense delivery systems. Utah’s Indigent Defense Act (IDA) mandates a single-source approach to the provision of indigent defense: indigent defendants who require additional “defense resources” to adequately prepare for trial, such as investigators or expert witnesses, must agree to be represented by the county or municipality’s “defense service provider.” A defendant who elects to retain private counsel is not entitled to additional funds from the county or municipality for any additional “defense resources.”

This “single-source approach” does not affect those defendants who are too poor to hire an attorney or those defendants wealthy enough to both retain counsel and pay the cost of whatever additional defense resources are necessary to adequately prepare for trial. But for defendants who are marginally indigent, who have the financial resources to retain counsel but are unable to afford additional “defense resources,” the single-source approach forces them to waive either their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice or their Fourteenth Amendment right to “the basic tools of an adequate defense.”

Defendants have the right to select an attorney who will be the architect of their defense, but they also have the right to “the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.” Utah’s single-source approach to indigent defense ignores the fact that these rights are two separate and distinct constitutional rights and conditions a defendant’s access to additional resources on a waiver of their right to counsel of their own choice. Now that the Supreme Court of Utah has decided that the IDA’s single-source approach is constitutional, marginally indigent defendants in Utah who wish to retain counsel, but also need additional defense resources to adequately prepare for trial, have no other option than to appeal to the Federal Courts. Whatever decision is ultimately reached by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, it is abundantly clear that the IDA’s single-source approach to indigent defense is yet another legislative effort to avoid adequately funding an indigent defense system that would seem to have “no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights.”

Development

by David Westin

This speech was given at the 2015 Lewis F. Powell Lecture on April 1, 2015 in the Millhiser Moot Court Room at Washington and Lee University.

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